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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
EDYTH H. WESTERFIELD, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
WILMER T. COOP, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
YOUNG, THATCHER & GLASMANN 
Attorneys for Respondent 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
In this brief we refer to the parties as they ap-
peared in the court below. The record on appeal is in 
two volumes, one of which consists of the pleadings, 
minute entries, and similar papers. All references to 
this volume are designated by the letter "R." The 
other volume which is separately numbered is a trans-
cript of the testimony and proceedings at the trial. 
References to this volume are designated by th1e letter 
"T". 
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ADDITIONAL STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent feels that some additional facts to those 
contained in appellant's brief should be brought to the 
court's attention for a· full understanding of the fac-
tual situation involved in this case. 
Defendant's pleadings in this case as contained 
in his answer amounted to some admissions and a general 
denial as to certain allegations contained in plaintiff's 
complaint. The defendant fail'ed, in his pleadings, to 
plead affirmatively or allege in any manner the statutes 
or laws of Utah or California. See defendants answer 
as contained in R. The only place in the R. or T. that 
def'endant relied upon an affirmative defense to plain-
tiff's cause of action as set forth in plaintiffs com-
plaint was, at the time of trial, when defendant moved 
the court for permission to amend his answer so that 
the same might contain the affirmative defense of Stat-
ute of Limitations. Plaintiff, at that time, requested 
the court to require the defendant to state his amend-
ment with particularity. The court so advised defend-
ant and defendant thereafter stated into the record the 
amendment to his answer in the following words: "Para-
graph 8. As a further defens'e, the defendant alleges 
that the Statute of Limitations has run on all amounts 
claimed to be due prior to April1947." See T. 36. 
The defendant also failed to plead, allege or prove 
at any time or place in the trial court below, as a de-
fense or otherwise, the statutes or laws of the States 
of California or Utah. SeeR. and T. generally. 
The plaintiff attempted many times, by personal 
pl'ea and court action, over the period of years that the 
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support money was accruing, for which plaintiff was 
given judgment against defendant and from which judg-
ment this appeal stems, to obtain payment from the 
defendant of the support payments which he had been 
ordered to pay by tlre California court. See T. 12, 21, 22. 
The defendant was generally employed during the 
period of time for which the lower court awarded jud-
ment for support moneys, to-wit, 1947 to 1952, the 
majority of said period of time bei~g employed by the 
Southern Pacific Railroad Company. See T. 24, 25. 
During all of the years that defendant was supposed 
to be paying support moneys to plaintiff under the 
order of the California court, to-wit, from the year 1942 
to and including the year 1952, the defendant paid to 
plaintiff the total of only $490.00, and of which, $465.00 
was paid as Army allotments through the Army and 
only $25.00 was paid by defendant personally. See 
paragraph 3 of Findings of Fact as contained in the R. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1, APPELLANTS DESIGNATION OF 
POINTS: Appellant has based all of his argument under 
the one designation i.e. Tire court errored in failing 
to dismiss the complaint for the reason that said com-
plaint failed to state a cause for action upon which relief 
could be granted. We will adopt the same method in 
this answering brief. 
Tire facts as related above and in plaintiff's brief 
disclose a judgment awarded in California in favor of 
plaintiff and against defendant for the support of plain-
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tiff and three minor children of the parties, and for the 
purpose nf this appeal the award was for monthly in~ 
stallments of $100.00 per month. Plaintiff, in her com-
plaint, alleg'ed the judgment and the amount due and 
unpaid thereunder. Defendant, in his pleadings, ad-
mitted the judgment but denied the amount due and in 
a subsequent amendment to the pleadings at the .time 
of trial defendant asserted generally the Statute of 
Limitations as an affirmative defense as a bar to any 
recovery for any sum due prior to April of 1947. The 
lower court, in its Findings and Judgment, awarded 
plaintiff judgment against the defendant only foT sup-
port moneys accruing from April, 1947. It is obvious 
therefore, that the lower court followed defeDdan-ts re-
quest to assert the bar of the Statute of Limitations as 
to all support payments accruing prior to April, 1947. 
This is so even though defendant, in his amended plead-
ing, failed to assert the specific statute of limitations 
upon which he relied as required by our law, At any 
rate, the defendant did not, at any time in the court 
below, assert the Statute of Limitations of any state, 
either in general terms or specifically as a bar to the 
recovery of support ·payments w·hich accrued from 
April, 1947 and for which plaintiff was granted judg-
ment by the trial court. 
It is well settled that the defense of Statute of 
Limitations' is a procedural 1natter and governed ·by 
the law of the forum. The law of the forum, Utah in 
this case, is contained in Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
Rule 9(h), to-wit: '"In pleading the Statute of Limita-
tions it is not necessary to state the facts showing the 
defense but it may be alleged generally that the ca-use 
·4 
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of action is barred by the prov~swns of the statute 
relied on, referring to or describing such statute spec-
ifically and definitely by section number, sub-section 
designation, if any, or otherwise designating the pro-
vision reli.ed upon sufficiently clear to identify it -
(Italics ours). 
As to the remaining question pres'ented by defend-
ant on appeal, to-wit, that of enforcement of a foreign 
judgment, the plaintiff would like to state that the 
general law on this subject matter is set forth in 41 
ALR 1419, 57 ALR 1113, 94 ALR 331. A summation of 
the law on this point is briefly set forth at pages 1419 
and 1420 of tlre afore-described 41 ALR as follows: 
"The United States Supreme Court and the various 
other courts whose decisions are cited below have held: 
(a) That a decree for future alimony is within the pro-
tecion of the full faith and credit laws of the Federal 
Constitution, (Barber v. Barber), 21 HOW (U.S.) 582, 
16 L. ed. 226; (b) Except so far as its enforcement 
is subject to the discretion of the court which rendered 
it (Lynde v. Lynde), 181 U.S. 183, 45 L. ed. 810; (c) 
And therefore, that it may be enforced as to past due 
installments where the power of the court rendering it 
to modify it if exerted can only operate prospectively 
(Sistare v. Sistare), 218 U.S. 1, 54 L. led. 905." 
The Utah case of Roundy v. Roundy, 202 P. 211 is 
cited under the afore-described paragraph (c) as being 
in accord with the holding that past due installments 
are entitled to full faith and credit treatm~ent. 
The law on the matter is also cited at Page 1113 
of the afore-described 57 ALR. "The rule is that a 
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judgment for alimony payable in installments rendered 
upon entering a decree for divorce constitutes a final 
judgment within the full faith and credit clause of the 
Federal Constitution so far as accrued installments are 
concerned, no modification of the decree having been 
made prior thereto, unless it appear from the law of 
the jurisdiction wherein the decree was granted that 
the power of modification expressly retained extends 
to accrued as well as to future installments of alimony." 
The present ruling authority on the question of 
full faith and credit and its application to alimony and 
support judgments is the case of Sistare v. Sistare, 
supra. This cas~e came along after the well known 
United States Supreme Court cases of Barber v. Barber 
and Lynde v. Lynde, supra, and commented upon those 
earlier cases in its decision as follows: 
"And answering the question not only by the light 
of reason but by the authoritive force of the ruling of 
the Barber case which had prevailed for so many years 
and by th'e reason expressed in the Lynde case, we think 
that the conclusion is inevitable that the Lynde case 
cannot be held to have over-ruled the Barber case, and 
th'erefore, that the two cases must be interpreted in 
harmony, one with the other, and that on so doing it 
results: 
"First, that, generally speaking where a decree is 
rendered for alimony and is made payable in future 
installments, the right to such installments becomes 
absolute and vested upon becoming due and is there-
fore protected by the full faith and credit clause, pro-
vided no modification of the decree has been rnade prior 
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to the maturity of the installments, since, as decreed in 
the Barber case, 'alimony declared to a wife in a di-
vorce-is as much a debt of record, until the decree has 
been recalled, as any other judgment for money is.' 
"Second, that this general rule, however, does not 
obtain whereby the law of the state in which a judgment 
for future alimony is rendered the right to demand and 
receive such future alimony is discretionary with the 
court which rendered the decree, to such an extent that 
no absolute or vested right attaches to receive the in-
stallments ordered by the decree to be paid, even al-
though no application to annul or modify the decree in 
respect to alimony has been made prior to the install-
ments becoming due." (Italics ours). 
The court in the Sistare case further stated, in 
commenting whether there was retained in the statute 
of the state the power to am'end alimony installments 
already accrued, as follows: "But it is equally certain 
that nothing in this language expressly gives power to 
revoke or modify an installment of alimony which had 
accrued prior to the making of an application to vary 
or modify, and every reasonable implication must be 
resorted to against the existence of such power in the 
absence of clear language manifesting an intention to 
confer it." 
In addition to relying upon the Lynde cas~e, which 
has been modified by the decision in the Sistare case, 
or at least the interpretation given of the Lynde case 
by tire defendant, has been modified by the Sistare case 
interpretation of the Lynde case, the defendant relies 
upon the Utah case of Hunt v. Monroe, 91 P. 269 and 
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states that said case is the only Utah case on this point. 
Plaintiff submits that there are other later Utah cases on 
the particular point and that in the Utah case of Roundy 
v. Roundy supra, the court held as to support payments 
owing by a father to a mother for the support of minor 
children that "the obligation however, follows the father 
wherever he may go and in view of the decision in 
Sistare v. Sistare the past due installments of alimony 
may be in forced in the State of Idaho under the full 
faith and credit laws of the Federal Constitution." 
(Italics ours). 
In the Utah case of Myers v. Myers, 218 P. 123, our 
court comments on the earlier case of Hunt v. J.I;Jonroe 
which is relied upon by defendant and announced that 
in the Hunt v. Monroe case "the court there followed the 
Supreme Court of the United States in Lynde v. Lynde. 
In that case the court indulged the presumption that 
the laws of Colorado were the same as the laws of 
Utah in the absence of any proof as to what the laws 
of that state were." (Italics ours). It is also pointed 
out in Myers v. Myers, "that the effect of the opinion in 
the Lynde case was to modify the Barber case-the 
opinion of this court in Hunt v. Monroe was announced 
in 1907. Subsequent to that time in 1910, the Supreme 
Court of the United States in an elaborate opinion 
(Sistare v. Sistare) adhered to the ruling in Barber v. 
Barber and differentiated the Lynde and Barber cases, 
and in effect holds that the two cases considered to-
gether are not necessarily in conflict, 'and in any event, 
if there be, that Lynde v. Lynde mHst be restricted or 
qualified so as to cause it not to over-rule the decision 
in the Barber case." (Italics ours). The Utah court, 
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in the case of Myers v. Myers, then went on to set forth 
the ruling of the Sistare case as set out supra, and in 
interpreting the Utah law on the subject matter, adopted 
the exact language of its holding as the law of Utah 
as follows : "But it is equally certain that nothing in 
this language expressly gives power to revoke or modify 
an installment of alimony which had accrued prior to 
the making of the application to vary or modify, and 
every reasonable implication must be resorted to a-: 
gainst the existance of such power in the absence of 
clear language manifesting an intention to confer it." 
(Italics ours). 
Plaintiff is fully aware however, that the Myers V·. 
Myers case was subsequently over-ruled by the Utah 
case of Austad v. Austad, 269 P. 2d 284, only however, 
insofar as it was in conflict on the question of whether 
alimony installments automatically terminated upon the 
remarriage of the wife. The Austad case of course 
holds that alimony installments automatically terminate 
upon the remarriage of the wif'e. The Austad case how-
ever, is not authority in this regard as to support pay-
ments for minor children nor as to application of the 
full faith and credit provision of the Federal Con-
stitution. 
It would appear then from the foregoing that Utah 
adopts the law as set forth in tlre Sistare case, supra, 
to-wit, the enforcement of foreign judgments for ali-
mony and support money as to accrued installments 
and that the Utah law as to accrued support payments 
for minor children· is a final judgment and enforceable 
under tlre full faith and credit provision of the Federal 
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Constitution and that accrued alimony payments due 
up to the time of the remarriage of the wife have the 
effect of being a final judgment for money and likewise 
'enforceable under the full faith and credit clause. 
Some of the cases cited by defendant in his brief 
are cases in which the California courts have enforced 
foreign judgments and then commented upon the law 
as it might apply to California, the latter being dictum 
only. 
Plaintiff will now set forth for the court's consider-
ation decisions from other jurisdictions wherein the 
courts considered problems similar to the ones here at 
issue and granted full faith and credit enforcement of 
California decrees for alimony and support installments 
already accrued as being final judgments. See the 
following: 
In the case of Caples v. Caples, 47 F. 2d 225, 284 
US 630, in an action in a Federal Court sitting in 
Texas, to recover installments of alimony (for the sup-
port of the wife and a minor child) accrued under a 
decree of divorce of a California court, held that the 
decree of the California court is entitled to full faith 
and credit as a fixed judgment where, although it ap-
pears that under the California Code the Court awarding 
alimony may from time to time modify its order in 
that respect, it does not appear that the California court 
may modify the decree as to alimony that has accrued, 
but on the contrary it appears that it cannot do so. 
Also see the Oregon case of Cousineau v. Cousineau, 
63 P. 2d 897. In this case, involving an action by the 
10 
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wife to collect arrears of past due alimony under a 
California decree of divorce, the defense being that the 
California decree was not a final decree and not en-
titled to full faith and credit, the court presumed that 
the California law as to power of the court to modify 
the decree as to past due installments of alimony was 
the same as the law of Oregon, under which the court 
had no power to modify the decree retroactively as to 
accrued installments, and held that as to such instaU-
ments the suit in Oregon was predicated upon a foreign 
final judgment within the full faith and credit clause. 
For a similar holding see the Washington case of 
Shibley v. Shibley, 42 P. 2d 446. 
Also see the Colorado case of McGregor v. Mc-
Gregor, 122 P. 390, where the Colorado court lreld that 
a California decree for past due installments for alimony 
was entitled to enforcement in the State of Colorado 
as being within the full faith and credit clause of th'e 
Federal Constitution. 
See also the California cases of Steele v. Steele, 239 
P. 2d 63, and Keck v. Keck, 26 P. 2d 300, where th'e 
courts of California held that accrued unpaid install-
ments for alimony and support money are final judg-
ments and cannot be modified. 
The defendant failed to plead or offer in evidence 
the statutes and laws of the State of California in any 
manner whatsoever in the trial court below, and· de-
fendant cannot now, upon appeal to the Supreme Court 
of Utah, start relying upon the statutes and laws of the 
State of California for the reason that the law of the 
majority of the jurisdictions in the United States, in-
11 
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eluding the State of Utah, is that in order for a party 
to a law suit to rely upon the statutes or laws of a 
foreign or sister state, he must specifically plead the 
statute or law relied upon and thereafter prove the 
same by offering competent evidence thereof in the 
trial court. S'ee 41 Am. Jur. 296. "Where it is not other-
wise provided by statute, the courts do not take judicial 
knowledge of the laws of foreign states, and where 
such statutes are material to the controversy and are 
relied on as a basis of a right of action or as a defense, 
they must be set forth by the pleader so that the court 
may judge of their effect. The rule applies as well to 
the statute of a foreign country and those of a sister 
state, neither of which is provable if not pleaded. The 
rule extends as to a settled construction by a court of 
last resort of a state enacting a statute which is relied 
upon to control the judgment of a court of another 
state. In the absence of a statute to the contrary, it is 
the general rule that if a settled construction by a 
court of last resort placed upon its own statutes is 
relied upon to control the judgment of a court of 
another state in interpreting such statues that settled 
construction must be pleaded and prored. The basis 
of this general rule is that the courts cannot take jud-
icial knowledge of the laws or decisions of the courts 
of other states, and they will not go beyond the aver-
ments of the pleading except as they rnay be aided by 
the presumption that the law is the sante as that of the 
forum." (Italics ours). 
Also see 20 An1. Jur. 182. "Courts of one state do 
not, as a general rule, take judicial notice of the laws 
of another state or country. Ordinarily when a litigant 
12 
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relies upon such foreign laws as the basis of his claim 
or defense h'e must plead and prove such laws. How~ 
ever, with regard to the laws of a sister state the broad 
rule prevails that in an absence of a showing to the 
contrary such laws will be presumed to be the same as 
the laws of the forum. - A more accurate statement 
of the rule is to the effect that the court presumes, in 
the absence of evidence to the contrary, that the common 
law of a sister state is the same as its own. The burden 
of proving the law of another state rests upon the party 
who claims rights under it and in the absence of such 
proof th'e trial court is authorized to presume that the 
same rule of law that obtains there prevails in the 
other state. Thus, in accordance with this rule it will 
be presumed that the law of a sister state as to which 
there is no proof is the same as that of the forum in 
respect of public policy." (Italics ours) The last cited 
Am. Jur. authority cites the Utah case of Dickson v. 
Mullings, et al 241 P. 840 as being in accord therewith. 
The Utah court there held : "No statute of N'ew York 
is either pleaded or proved. It of course is well settled 
that state courts cannot take judicial notice of laws or 
statutes of a sister state. It also is well settled in this 
jurisdiction that, in the absence of proof, it will be pre-
sumed that the law of another state is the same as the 
law of the forum-." (Italics ours). 
In the Utah case of Shurtleff v. Oregon Shortline 
Railroad Company, 241 P. 1058, in which the law of 
Idaho was pleaded but no evidence or proof of the law 
placed in the record, our court held: "In absence of 
proof, it will be presumed that law of another state is 
the same of that of forum, and presumption is ex-
13 
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tended to statutory as well as common law." (Italics 
ours). 
In the Utah case of Todaro v. Gardner, 285 P. 2d 
839, the court held: "The Arizona law was not pleaded 
below and hence this court follows the legal presumption 
that in the absence of 1evidence to the contrary the 
Statute of another state on a particular subject is 
deemed to be the same as the statute of this state." 
(Italics ours). Also see Buhler v. Maddison, 140 P. 
2d 933, a Utah case of a similar holding. 
Also S1ee the following Utah cases for similar hold-
ings but of more recent vintage: Whitmore Oxygen Com-
pany v. Utah State Tax Commission, 196 P. 2d 976. 
United Airlines Transport Corporation et al v. Indust-
rial Commission et al, 151 P. 2d 591. In the last Utah 
case cited supra on commenting upon the laws of our 
sister state of California, our Supreme Court h'eld: 
"Where laws of a foreign state are not offered in evi-
dence, Supreme Court must conclude that laws of such 
state are the same as those of the forurn." (Italics ours). 
On the question of whether a court may, in its 
administration of equity and justice, apportion lump 
sum support installments after the final decree of 
divorce has been entered when the wife remarries and 
minor children from time to time attain their majority 
as occurred in th~e case now at issue, the plaintiff con-
tends that the trial court of the forum may do so as 
long as the apportionn1ent follows the dictates of justice 
and equitable principles. There does not appear to be 
a great deal of authority on this particular point. Plain-
tiff however, desires to cite for the court's consideration 
14 
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the following: Wilkins v. Wilkins, 224 P. 2d 371. This is 
a California case where a wife had been awarded a lump 
sum per month for joint support of herself and minor 
children and the court held that: "After minor children 
attained their majority wife was not in equity and good 
conscience entitled to receive full amount of monthly 
support nor to require husband to continue paying for 
support of children after their majority. Trial court 
in exercise of its discretion in issuing a Writ of Ex-
ecution of a divorce decree requiring husband to make 
monthly payments for support of wife and minor child-
ren, had duty to determine extent of husband's legal 
and equitable liability to pay under judgment." 
The court in the Wilkins case above, cited the case 
of Probst v. Probst, 21 N.Y.S. 2d 294, wherein the court 
held: "That a l'ltmp sum ordered in support of the wife 
and son might be divided and an allocation of it made 
for each if the basis of the allocation was reasonable." 
(Italics ours). 
In the case of Frost v. Frost 21 N.Y.S. 2d 438, 
alimony allowed in a lump sum was reduced as of the 
date the younger child attained her majority and in the 
case of Gerrein's Adm'r v. Michie, 91 S. W. 252, the 
Kentucky court held: "That such deductions were proper 
when the chancellor was called upon to enforce the 
judgment." 
Again on this point in a most recent California 
case of Anderson v. Anderson, 276 P. 2d 862, th1e Cali-
fornia court held: "That where divorce decree provided 
for alimony and support of two children without seg-
regation as to amount, and older child reached his 
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majority, Superior Court properly refused to consider 
the divorce decree void and properly proceeded to de-
termine whether execution should issue for accru1ed 
installments, and, if so, for what amount, and whether 
decree should be modified prospectively." The Cali-
fornia court held further: "Tire position of the Califor-
nia courts as to unsegregated decrees for support of 
wife and children after majority of any of the latter is 
well settled. In Wilkins v. Wilkins, 213 P. 2d 748, there 
appears an excellent review of cases on the subject. 
The rule is that the court may modify the prior decree 
prospectively but may not make a modification operative 
on payments already accrued but execution on the later 
payments may not issue as a matter of right. The court 
has the discretion of determining under the equities of 
the situation whetlrer execution should issue for all or 
any portion of the accrued amounts." 
In accordance with plaintiff's position supra, the 
plaintiff does not contend that the law afore cited as 
the law of the State of California is binding upon the 
Utah Supreme Court, but on the contrary states again 
that inasmuch as th1e law of California was not pleaded 
nor proved in the trial court below it cannot be relied 
upon in the Supreme Court, and that judicial notice of 
the law of the State of California should not be taken but 
that under the law of the State of Utah as set forth supra, 
the court in the absence of pl'eading or proof of the law 
of a foreign or sister state will presume the foreign law 
to be the same as the law of the forun1. The plaintiff 
merely cites the line of cases n~ext above cited for the 
purpose of showing the court that apportionment of lump 
sum installments awards is often done by trial courts 
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and arprproved by appellate courts. 
The trial court in the case now at issue used its 
good discretion in applying 'equity and reason in work-
ing with all the facts as proved by evidence that were 
before it and apportioned the lump .sum Cali£ornia 
judgment of $100.00 per month at the rate of $25.00 per 
plaintiff and $25.00 per each minor child .and allowed 
plaintiff nothing for alimony .by reason of the fact 
that she had remarried but did allow in its judgment 
$25.00 per month for each of the minor children of the 
parHes from April, 1947 to the date when they attained 
their individual majority. Such a judgment is, witbout 
question, bas'ed upon equitable principles 'and good 
reason. 
Plaintiff has set _forth herein her reasons why 
defendant's attack on the ,judgment rendered by the 
lower court should fail. However, in the -1event the 
Supreme Court feels that the California judgment in-
volved herein is not required to be inforced under .the 
.full faith and credit provisions of the Federal Constitu-
tioo there is still anothe.r argume.n.t as to w-hy .t.he Cali-
fornia judgment should be enforced and t.hat is wpon 
the principles of comity. See in this regard 132 A.L.R. 
1272, which is an annotation of the cases which have 
expressly considered the question whether a foreign de-
·cree of alimony not within the full faith and credit pro-
vision may nevertheless be recognized and enfor.ced in the 
forum under the principles of :comity and attention is 
called to the fact that many of the cases which have been 
-denied full faith and cr.edit enforcement .of the decree and 
refus'ed to enforce it locally have done .so withol!lt 
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further considering the question whether it could be 
properly enforced under principles of comity. This 
particular ALR has the following statement to make 
concerning this problem: "Since the holding that there 
was no constitutional obligation to enforce does not lead 
to the conclusion that there was no obligation not to 
enforce, these cases are at most neutral on the question 
under consideration." (Italics ours). The ALR cites 
that the cases which have considered the question of 
comity are few and those are in conflict. However, the 
ALR, commencing on page 1275, cites the jurisdictions 
which have adopted the principles of comity and among 
them is the State of California. The California case 
being that of Biewend v. Biewend, 109 P. 2d 701, and 
court in this case holds: "That a :Missouri decree as 
to future installments of alimony although not enititled 
to enforcement in California under the full faith and 
credit provision of the Federal Constit1dion because it 
was subject to modification as to such installments by 
the court of Missouri on the ground of the divorced) 
wife's subsequent remarriage - or the arriving at ma-
jority of the children of the marriage, 1cas entitled to 
enforcement under the rules of com,ity by th'e rendition 
of a California decree therein, good until the ~Iissouri 
court had in fact modified its decree upon th1e appli-
cation of the husband to that court, although the rule of 
comity permitting the enforcen1ent of any foreign de-
crees for future instalhnents of ali1nony is subject to 
the qualification that the enforcement thereof in Cali-
fornia would not controvene the public policy of Califor-
nia." (Italics ours). 
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CONCLUSION 
The plaintiff would like to reiterate by way of con-
clusion that she takes the position that in the first place, 
defendant cannot raise upon appeal tire matters he is 
attempting to raise when he did not plead or prove the 
statutes or laws of California in the lower court, and 
that it will therefore be presumed that tire law of Cali-
fornia is the same as the law of the forum and that 
under the law of the forum a judgment for support 
money for children is final and entitled to enforcem'ent 
under the full faith and credit provision of the Federal 
Constitution, and that even if the court finds that the 
particular decree involved herein is not entitled to en-
forcement under the full faith and credit clause it may 
nevertheless be enforced under the equitabte principles 
of comity, and that the lower court's judgment rendered 
herein is based upon justice and good r'eason. In fact, 
it would be shocking if the defendant herein did not 
have to pay anything, and could therefore continue to 
dodge his responsibility to his family as he has done 
so successfully in the past. The judgment of the court 
below should be affirmed for the reasons stated herein. 
Respectfully submitted, 
YOUNG, THATCHER & GLASMANN, 
.~ At~~orneys for Respondent .1" 7tflE~V1~~~, 
,/ -
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